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CONTRACTS
I. TIEPLD WARANTY
Perhaps the most interesting case in the field of contracts dur-
ing the survey period was Springfield v. Wiliams Plumbing
Supply Co.1 This case concerned the necessity of privity of con-
tract between the parties in order for the purchaser of a product
to recover on an implied warranty from the manufacturer and
the wholesaler.
The appeal was brought when the circuit court denied the
motions to dismiss by the manufacturer and the wholesaler of
an electric hot water heater which exploded and caused both
personal injuries and property damage to the plaintiffs. The
basis of both motions was that there was no privity of contract
between the manufacturer and the wholesaler and the plaintiff
purchasers and that a cause of action for breach of implied
warranty could not be maintained in the absence of such privity.
The contention of the appellants was founded on the decision
of Odom 'v. Ford Motor Company2 and the general rule stated
there "that privity of contract is required in an action for breach
of an implied warranty and that there is no such privity be-
tween a manufacturer and one who has purchased the manufac-
tured article from a dealer or is otherwise a remote vendee."3
However, after stating this rule, the Odom court recognized an
exception in cases involving products which are "inherently
dangerous to human safety." Also a careful reading of the
Odom case will reveal that it was not dealing with either per-
sonal injury or property damage but only with the alleged fail-
ure of a tractor to properly perform the farm tasks for which
it was purchased. The court in Springfield recognized this and
stated that they did not consider Odom to be controlling in the
instant case. 4
The court in Springfield acknowledged that the question of
whether a remote vendee can maintain a personal and property
damage action against the manufacturer and the wholesaler of a
product on the theory of implied warranty in the absence of
privity is one of novel impression in this jurisdiction but that it
1. 249 S.C. 130, 153 S.E.2d 184 (1967).
2. 230 S.C. 320, 95 S.E.2d 601 (1956).
3. Id. at 325, 95 S.E2d at 603-04.
4. For a more complete discussion of Odom and its implications, see, Note
17 S.C.L. REv. 259 (1965).
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is far from novel in other jurisdictions.5 The court recognized
that the privity requirement has recently been abandoned alto-
gether by many courts in products liability cases.6 A case indi-
cating this trend which also provides an excellent summary of
the implied warranty theory is Picker X-Ray Corp. v. G.M.C.
7
The court pointed out that "the whole field of products lia-
bility law is still in a state of flux and development"8 and hinted
that the plaintiffs in the instant case might well be entitled to
recover on some theory other than breach of an implied war-
ranty. The cases in this state which have held a manufacturer
liable to a remote vendee have generally been based on negligence
in tort.9 Of course it is a great advantage to be able to recover
in warranty without having to establish privity. Proof of negli-
gence which is essential for a recovery in tort is not required in
order to recover in warranty. Dean Prosser says that although
warranty is recognized as both contract and tort, "[ilt would
be far simpler if it were simply said that there is strict liability
in tort . . . without an illusory contract mask."' 0
After a concise but admirable review of the implied warranty
area, the court concluded that these questions of novel impres-
sion were of such importance to this jurisdiction and that they
could have such far reaching effects that they should not be
decided on a motion to dismiss or demurrer. The trial of this
case and the appeal which is almost certain to follow should be
interesting to observe, as its decision could indeed be far reaching
in the development of South Carolina law in the area of products
liability.
II. SPECIF C PEMoRMANCE
In Bishop v. Tolbert" the South Carolina Supreme Court fol-
lowed well settled South Carolina law in holding that in a con-
5. For annotation on the subject see 75 A.L.R.2d 39 (1961).
6. E.g., Henningsen v. Bloomfield Motors, Inc., 32 N.J. 358, 161 A.2d 69,
75 A.L.R.2d 1 (1960); Spence v. Three Rivers Builders & Masonry Supply,
Inc., 353 Mich. 120, 90 N.W.2d 873 (1958); Blanton v. Cudahy Packing Co.,
154 Fla. 872, 19 So. 2d 313 (1944).
7. 185 A.2d 919 (D.C. 1962).
8. Springfield v. Williams Plumbing Supply Co., Inc., 249 S.C. 130, 153
S.E.2d 184 (1967).
9. E.g., Salladin v. Tellis, 247 S.C. 267, 146 S.E.2d 875 (1966); Gantt v.
Columbia Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 193 S.C. 51, 7 S.E.2d 641, 127 A.L.R. 1185
(1940); Hunter v. Allied Mills, Inc., 184 S.C. 330, 192 S.E. 356 (1937). The
Salladin case, while extending liability to the manufacturer, also held the sup-
plier of the defective part liable.
10. W. PnossER, LAW OF ToRTs 681 (3d ed. 1964).
11. 153 SE2d 912 (S.C. 1967).
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tract for the sale of real estate, although time is not generally
of the essence when the contract is originally executed, it may
be made of the essence by the situation or conduct of the par-
ties. 12 Or if the time of performance has passed, one party may
make time of the essence by giving notice to the other party that
he will insist on performance by a certain date, provided, of
course, that the time allowed by the notice is reasonable.
13
The court found that time was made of the essence in this case
by the vendors and since the purchasers had not tendered or
offered to tender the purchase price within the extended time,
they were not entitled to compel the vendors to specifically
perform. For it is an established South Carolina principle that
the granting of specific performance is not a matter of absolute
right but rests in the sound or judicial discretion of the court,14
whether the contract be in writing or oral.15 And he who de-
mands the execution of a contract, in which the covenants are
dependent and concurrent, as here, must show that there has been
no default in performing all that was to be done on his part.16
Norton W. Matt hews 7 was a suit for specific performance of
an alleged oral contract to devise a tract of land in consideration
of services rendered. The state supreme court relied on prior
South Carolina cases in refusing to enforce the alleged contract.
One of the requirements for specific performance of such a con-
tract is that the promisee shall have rendered a complete per-
formance"8 and, if this becomes impossible, that it shall have
been through no fault of his own.19 The promisee must prove
this by evidence so unquestionable that there can be no reasonable
doubt as to its truth.20 The court ruled that the promisees in
this case had failed to produce that high degree of proof and,
therefore, denied specific performance.
12. Speed v. Speed, 213 S.C. 401, 49 S.E2d 588 (1948).
13. 91 C.J.S. Vendor & Purchaser § 104c (1955).
14. E.g., Flowers v. Roberts, 220 S.C. 110, 66 S.E2d 612 (1951); Mitchum
v. Mitchum, 183 S.C. 75, 190 S.E. 104 (1936); Mobley v. Quattlebaum, 101
S.C. 221, 85 S.E. 585 (1914).
15. Flowers v. Roberts, 220 S.C. 110, 66 S.E.2d 612 (1951).
16. Cureton v. Gilmore, 3 S.C. 46 (1871).
17. 249 S.C. 71, 152 S.E2d 680 (1967).
18. Samuel v. Young, 214 S.C. 91, 51 S.E2d 367 (1949); Young v. Levy,
206 S.C. 1, 32 S.E.2d 889 (1944).
19. Young v. Levy, 206 S.C. 1, 32 S.E.2d 889 (1944); Bruce v. Moon, 57
S.C. 60, 35 S.E. 415 (1899).
20. Samuel v. Young, 214 S.C. 91, 51 S.E.2d 367 (1949).
1967]
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III. BOND FOR Tn _z
The Supreme Court of South Carolina in Wahl v. Hutto2"
turned to Arkansas22 and Georgia 28 law in holding that a bond
for title is merely an agreement to make title in the future de-
pend upon the happening of certain conditions and is therefore
an incomplete sale. South Carolina real estate cases have long
recognized the conditional delivery of papers, 24 and a promise to
pay a broker's commission "when the sale is completed" has been
held to be conditional.25 Based on the testimony, the court con-
cluded that the bond for title was not a binding contract of sale
but was conditional, thereby precluding the brokers from recov-
ering commissions for a sale when the condition was not met.
IV. UNSPECIFIED PAYMENT TO CREDITOR
The United States District Court in Davis Meter and Supply
Company v. Coastal Water Company28 cited Williston27 and the
Restatement of Contracts28 and was in agreement with prior
South Carolina cases 20 in holding that when a debtor makes
payment to his creditor without specifying to which debt the
payment is to be applied, the creditor may apply the money to
any debt which is due. But until all the matured debts are satis-
fied, the creditor cannot apply the payment to debts which are
not matured nor to advances for future orders, as the creditor
attempted in this case.
V. INTERPRETATION OF A CONTRACT
Dibble v. Dibble80 arose from a controversy over a family
agreement. The disputed part of the agreement provided that
the four children of Mrs. Annie L. W. Dibble should share
equally all gifts received by any of them from their uncle,
21. 155 S.E.2d 1 (S.C. 1967).
22. White v. Stokes, 67 Ark. 184, 53 S.W. 1060 (1899).
23. Ingram v. Smith, 62 Ga. App. 335, 7 S.E2d 922 (1940).
24. Epps v. King, 238 S.C. 75, 119 S.E.2d 229 (1961); Alexander v. Ker-
hulas, 151 S.C. 354, 149 S.E. 12 (1929).
25. Hamrick v. Cooper River Lumber Co., 223 S.C. 119, 74 S.E.2d 575
(1953).
26. 266 F. Supp. 887 (D.S.C. 1967).
27. 6 S. WiLLiSTON, ConTRActs § 1795 (rev. ed. 1938).
28. RESTATEMENT OF CoNmAcTs § 387(b) (1933).
29. See Brooks v. Central Baptist Church, 185 S.C. 200, 193 S.E. 326 (1937);
Hopper v. Hopper, 61 S.C. 124, 39 S.E. 366 (1901).
30. 248 S.C. 165, 149 S.E.2d 355 (1966).
[Vol. 19
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Samuel Dibble, during his lifetime, with several exceptions
which are irrelevant to this case. The agreement also contained
the following provision:
It is further agreed by all of the parties that nothing in this
agreement shall relate to any bequest or devise the said
Samuel Dibble shall make under and by virtue of his last
will and testament and that none of the parties hereto, in
connection with these agreements, shall be charged with
any gift or bequest received from the said uncle through his
last will and testament.31
The transaction which precipitated the dispute was the con-
veyance of two tracts of land on February 1, 1951, by Samuel
Dibble to Wortham W. Dibble as Trustee for one of the chil-
dren, Thomas W. Dibble. The land thus conveyed had been
designated for Thomas in the will of Samuel Dibble that was in
existence at the time that the family agreement was executed.
The deed under seal recited that the conveyance was made "in
consideration of the sum of Five ($5.00) Dollars, and partial
appreciation of years of unselfish service by Tom W. Dibble in
the management of my lands and other affairs." South Carolina
documentary stamps were affixed to it in the amount of $30.00
and United States documentary stamps in the amount of $18.50,
thus indicating that a substantial consideration was given for
the land.
In overruling the decision of the circuit court, the South Caro-
lina Supreme Court decided that this conveyance was not within
the purview of the family agreement and therefore not required
to be shared by Thomas with his brother and sisters. The lower
court had ruled that this was not a case in which the court could
consider the circumstances surrounding the execution of the
agreement in order to interpret the above quoted proviso because
the plain unambiguous language of the proviso shows that refer-
ence was to a future and not to an existing will.
The supreme court acknowledged that South Carolina cases
have held that when a contract is clear and unequivocable its
meaning must be determined by its content alone.32 But they
chose to rely on the cases that have held that the subject matter
and purpose of the contract are to be considered in ascertaining
31. Id. at 170, 149 S.F_2d at 358.
32. Bruce v. Blalock, 241 S.C. 155, 127 S.E2d 439 (1962) ; White v. White,
210 S.C. 336, 42 S.E.2d 537 (1947); McPherson v. J. E. Sirrine & Co., 206
S.C. 183, 33 S.E2d 501 (1944).
1967]
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the intention of the parties and the meaning of the terms they
have used and that the dry meaning of the words of the contract
should be so interpreted as to subserve, not subvert, such in-
tentions.
3
By its interpretation of the surrounding facts and the inten-
tion of the parties, the court concluded that at the time of the
execution of the agreement there was in existence a will executed
by Samuel Dibble containing a devise of the disputed land to
Thomas W. Dibble; that the parties to the agreement knew of
the will and intended to exclude that property from the agree-
ment; that the property was conveyed in February, 1951, because
of the probability that Samuel's marriage a few months earlier
had revoked his prior will, and that his purpose was to convey to
Thomas the property in accordance with the intention of the
former will. They also concluded on the basis of the documentary
stamps, the consideration recited in the deed and other evidence
which it is not necessary to mention at this time that the con-
veyance was made for valuable consideration and not as a gift
subject to the family agreement.
In Dean v. Amercan Fire and Casualty Company84 the South
Carolina Supreme Court held that an insurance contract pro-
viding for payment of medical expenses for injuries resulting
"through being struck by an automobile" would cover expenses
incurred when the insured's automobile fell from a jack and
crushed his finger. The court ruled that the quoted phrase -was
free from ambiguity and followed prior South Carolina cases 5
in holding that the words are to be taken and understood in
their plain, ordinary and popular sense and that such construc-
tion is for the court.
VI. AmITRrTiow AGRE~mNT
Derniok v. Comptons36 arose from an arbitration agreement and
the report of the arbitration board on the three questions which
had been submitted to it for determination. The board reported
that one of the questions was not to be considered because the
parties had mutually agreed that they had settled that question
33. Breedin v. Smith, 126 S.C. 346, 120 S.E. 64 (1923) ; Chatfield-Woods Co.
v. Harley, 124 S.C. 280, 117 S.E. 539 (1923).
34. 249 S.C. 39, 152 S.E.2d 247 (1967).
35. Kingsman v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 243 S.C. 405, 134 S.E.2d 217
(1964) ; Garrett v. Pilot Life Ins. Co., 241 S.C. 299, 128 S.E2d 171 (1962) ;
Quinn v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 238 S.C. 301, 120 S.E.2d 15 (1961).
36. 154 S.E.2d 573 (S.C. 1967).
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prior to the arbitration hearing. However, one of the parties
contended that he had not agreed to a settlement.
The circuit court refused to examine the completeness of the
arbitrators' report, but the state supreme court reversed, holding
that when one of the parties to an arbitration agreement alleges
that the arbitrators have not decided all of the issues submitted
to them, the court has the power to determine whether the arbi-
trators have fully performed their duties. Therefore, the case
was remanded to the circuit court for a review as to the com-
pleteness of the arbitrators' decision but not as to the merits of
the decision.
VII. PLACE OF CoNRACTING
In Arant v. First Southern Company8 7 the supreme court
found no South Carolina cases which laid down any rules for
determining where a contract was made. Therefore it followed
the general rule of law that "a contract is considered as entered
into at the place where the offer is accepted, or where the last
act necessary to a meeting of the minds or to complete the con-
tract . . . is performed."38s
Wm.,.,.x B. PARioCK, JR.
37. 153 S.E.2d 919 (S.C. 1967).
38. 17A C.J.S. Contracts § 356 (1963).
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